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The world’s trade ministers,
who will meet at a WTO ministe-
rial in November 2001 in Doha,
are wrong to think that only a
new round of negotiations will
save the much-maligned interna-
tional trade system. Instead, John
Audley and Ann Florini argue,
they should simultaneously tackle
internal and external reform of
the WTO to make it a truly equi-
table institution. Internally, indus-
trial countries must start treating
developing countries as equal
partners in making the rules that
govern global trade, and where
necessary provide technical assis-
tance to make that equality possi-
ble. More consistency between
trade-negotiation objectives (such
as market access for agricultural
products) and domestic policy pri-
orities (such as subsidies for local
producers) would help communi-
cate the message that industrial
countries take seriously their
commitment to a fair global trad-
ing system. Externally, to satisfy
legitimate public demands, mem-
bers should improve the trans-
parency of WTO proceedings and
permit public participation in
keeping with international norms.
These changes, however, will
occur only when national leaders
link internal and external reform
objectives—a step that will
require leadership from key coun-
tries as well as the WTO
Secretariat. 
More than one battle is currently rag-ing over trade and the global econ-
omy. While protesters clash with police at
global economic summits, the countries that
belong to the World Trade Organization
(WTO) also are clashing over whether a
new round of trade negotiations should be
launched later in 2001. Having described
Europe and the United States in a recent
Washington Post editorial “as the two biggest
elephants in the global economy,” European
Union trade commissioner Pascal Lamy 
and U.S. trade representative Robert
Zoellick are pressuring the rest of the world
into launching a new trade round at the
WTO ministerial scheduled for November
in Doha, Qatar: “The case for launching a
new round is clear [and] the potential
reward for success is great. The price for fail-
ure would be painfully high.” But trade
ministers from 49 least-developed countries
(LDCs)—tired of being stomped on by the
elephants—met in Zanzibar, Tanzania, in
July to express their determination to
“reverse the marginalization of our countries
in international trade and enhance LDCs’
effective participation in the multilateral
trading system.”
The outcome of the Doha meeting is
important, but the West’s emphasis on
launching a new round at this time is mis-
placed. No trade negotiations will succeed
until member governments make a com-
mitment to substantially reform the WTO
to enable it to responsibly and equitably
administer the international trading sys-
tem. This reform, not another round, is the
essential next step. The strength of the
multilateral trading system should be meas-
ured not by how many issues can be
thrown on the table, but by whether the
system provides fair and effective mecha-
nisms for negotiating trade rules and
whether it engenders widespread support.
An international institution with so much
influence over people’s lives must operate
with due process and public accountability.
It is time for the global trading system to
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earn support from the public whose interests
it claims to advance.
At Doha, member governments should
agree to reform the WTO’s internal manage-
ment and operations to ensure that all mem-
bers can understand and implement their
WTO obligations, and can engage each other
in trade negotiations as equal partners. They
also should agree to reform the way the WTO
interacts with the public to ensure that it
operates in an open, transparent fashion. And
they must take these two steps toward WTO
reform simultaneously. In the WTO today,
industrial countries are reluctant to share
power with developing countries, and devel-
oping countries are suspicious of public
involvement that would further dilute their
limited influence. Only when there is clear
evidence of internal reform can powerful
countries expect developing countries to con-
sider new trade obligations or embrace
increased public involvement and broader
social and environmental policy objectives.
Likewise, developing countries can use the
political capital they earn from agreeing to
external reforms to bargain for the internal
reforms they want. Linking these two items
together brings all sides—industrial and
developing countries, the WTO itself, and
members of civil society—together to pro-
duce a more legitimate and effective world
trading system.
The Need for Reform 
Industrial countries—under pressure from
slumping national economies and haunted by
the failure to launch a new round of multilat-
eral trade negotiations at the 1999 Seattle
WTO ministerial—are pressing for the
launch of a comprehensive round of negotia-
tions. During a July WTO meeting, Director-
General Mike Moore argued that the very
future of the global trading system is at stake: 
We cannot pretend that this can be merely
a “routine” Ministerial meeting. . . . Failure
to reach consensus on a forward work pro-
gram that would advance the objectives of
the multilateral trading system, particularly
in the light of the earlier failure at Seattle,
would lead many to question the value of
the WTO as a forum for negotiation. It
would certainly condemn us to a long
period of irrelevance, because it will not be
any easier next year, or the year after.
It is not surprising that the nongovern-
mental organizations (NGOs) that have led
the public protests against the WTO have
reacted negatively to the push for a new
round. NGOs fear what Public Citizen calls
the “final sale of democracy to corporate glob-
al capitalism.” What is new is that hostility to
a round is being expressed publicly by devel-
oping-country governments—the very coun-
tries that industrial-country governments
argue are best served by further negotiations.
In a speech on July 27, 2000, at the Barbican
Centre Hall in London, incoming WTO
director-general Supachai Panitchpakdi said
that “The top priority facing the WTO today
is first to identify and redress many of its
shortcomings. . . . We need to strengthen the
organization and rebuild confidence among
its members.”
These “round or no round” tensions fea-
tured by national and international media
are rooted in the changing nature of the
WTO, including its growing membership,
expanding agenda, and shifting relationship
with the outside world. The tensions can be
organized into two distinct categories for
reform (using terms already employed by
WTO members): internal reform (agenda
setting, decision-making procedures, and
redefining the WTO Secretariat’s responsi-
bilities) and external reform (the relationship
between the WTO and civil society).
Together, they constitute an agenda for
WTO institutional reform that is supported
by an overwhelming number of experts on
trade, the environment, and development.
These experts may disagree about the solu-
tions, but protesters and government officials
John Audley is senior asso-
ciate at the Carnegie
Endowment and director of its
new Trade, Environment, and
Development Project. He was
previously the trade policy
coordinator at the E.P.A., and
has also served as interna-
tional affairs director for the
National Wildlife Federation
and taught environmental and
public policy at Georgetown
University, Purdue University,
and the University of
Maryland. His publications
include “A Greener Fast Track:
Putting Environmental
Protection on the Trade
Agenda” (Carnegie Working
Paper, 2001) and Green Politics
and Global Trade (Georgetown
University Press, 1997).
The Trade, Environment, and
Development Project was cre-
ated to foster dialogue on the
complicated and controversial
policy tensions at the nexus of
international trade, environ-
mental protection, and eco-
nomic development. The proj-
ect is part of the Endowment’s
Global Policy Program.
alike believe that the WTO’s present struc-
ture and management are inadequate. 
Internal Reform
When it began operations on January 1,
1995, the WTO had 76 members. Since
then, its membership has grown to 142—an
87 percent increase. Nearly 75 percent of its
members are now developing countries—as
are nearly all of the 30 countries with appli-
cations still pending—but their numerical
dominance has not translated into influence,
or even regular participation. Currently, 28
developing-country WTO members and 9
observer countries have no permanent mis-
sion to the WTO headquarters in Geneva. At
least as many members have offices staffed by
fewer than five diplomats, many of whom
must also represent their countries at meet-
ings of other international institutions based
in Geneva, and in Brussels as well.
International trade rules now apply to 20
percent of the world’s production of goods
and services, whether traded internationally
or not. Both the number of trade disputes
and the range of issues have grown substan-
tially. Between 1980 and 1994, General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) sig-
natories engaged in 122 dispute consulta-
tions, of which 51 resulted in formal rulings
by a dispute-resolution panel. Between 1995
and 1999, under the WTO, the number of
consultations jumped to 185, leading to 62
panel reports. GATT dispute proceedings did
not include an appellate process, but 44 of
the WTO panel reports were contested,
resulting in as many appellate rulings. Under
the WTO, trade disputes now deal with a
wide range of national regulations. Recent
disputes involving the United States, for
example, have focused on trademarks and
licensing privileges, tax policies for offshore
business operations, laws to protect U.S. air
quality, antidumping protection for the U.S.
steel industry, and rules protecting threatened
or endangered marine life. 
But perhaps the most significant example
of WTO rules’ influence on domestic policy
involves the struggle of developing countries
to balance trade-related intellectual property
rights with their battle against the spread of
HIV/AIDS. The United States used trade
rules to pressure developing countries to
enforce the intellectual property rights of
multinational pharmaceutical companies,
which argued that their patent protections
were violated when countries such as Brazil
and India allowed domestic firms to manu-
facture generic HIV drugs for local popula-
tions lacking affordable access to life-saving
treatment. The United States—under intense
pressure from such citizens’ groups as Doctors
Without Borders and Oxfam International—
eventually withdrew its complaint. 
In response to complaints that developing
countries cannot negotiate on an equal foot-
ing with more powerful industrial countries,
the WTO Secretariat has begun to assist
developing countries in meeting their obliga-
tions, and it also has started to coordinate the
technical assistance efforts of other interna-
tional organizations. The WTO also works
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with the International Monetary Fund, the
United Nations Development Program, the
U.S. International Trade Commission, and
the World Bank to offer seminars that assist
developing-country government officials in
designing development strategies consistent
with international trade disciplines. Despite
these new responsibilities and its increased
membership, the WTO’s budget has grown
only 18 percent since 1995, to roughly $77
million, and its staff has increased only 6 per-
cent, to about 500.
In short, although the Uruguay Round
negotiators who created the WTO dramati-
cally improved trade-rule effectiveness, they
did not create an institution capable of taking
on the responsibilities they assigned it. The
negotiators apparently either did not fully
consider the responsibilities this new institu-
tion would face or ignored the demands that
would be made by a larger and more diverse
membership, a more heavily used dispute-set-
tlement mechanism, and growing pressure for
public involvement. 
The starting point for internal reform
should be discussions among WTO members
and the interested public. Such discussions
can only take place once the member govern-
ments acknowledge that internal manage-
ment is the problem—one that undermines
the important role trade rules can play in pro-
moting healthy economies.
The reform of agenda setting and deci-
sion making involves the reallocation of
power among WTO members. This reform
begins with the question, “Do WTO rules
and informal procedures preclude effective
participation by developing countries?” The
answer is often yes. For example, developing
countries cite practices such as negotiating a
“single undertaking”—concluding a set of
multiple negotiations simultaneously—as
favoring countries that are capable of staffing
simultaneous negotiations and whose politi-
cal circumstances allow them to swap conces-
sions in one area for gains in another. For a
country to be able to make such trade-offs
among policy issues that will be acceptable
back home—such as agreeing to eliminate
the use of countervailing duties in exchange
for eliminating price-distorting agricultural
subsidies—it must have a relatively mature
and open governing system. Developing-
country members, lacking parity with more
open industrial countries, must fall back on
the system’s rules to block decisions, resulting
in policy stalemates and resentment among
member governments. 
In theory, WTO operations are flexible
enough to adjust the negotiating format.
Indeed, its secretariat was created in part to
avoid complex negotiations by enabling
countries to address issues one at a time.
Seventeen committees continually discuss
country obligations under the current rules,
and two groups—agriculture and services—
are actively negotiating further liberalization
under the built-in agenda left over from the
Uruguay Round. Rules also exist to overcome
a lack of consensus by resorting to making
decisions by majority vote. However, neither
these rules nor the daily negotiating structure
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Only when there is clear evidence of 
internal reform can powerful countries
expect developing countries to consider new
trade or policy obligations.
has helped developing countries—especially
those that cannot afford a large staff in
Geneva—overcome their weak bargaining
positions. To many observers, the informal
norms and rules still concentrate agenda set-
ting and decision-making influence among a
few economically powerful governments. 
External Reform
Internal reform must be coupled with efforts
to reach out to a public that is more and more
alienated. As the disciplines of the global trad-
ing system have grown more effective, they
have alarmed many people, who are demon-
strating their concern both on the streets and
in repeated demands for greater transparency.
Many governments, especially of developing
countries, object strongly to calls for increased
citizen participation, arguing that public
input should take place only at the national
level and is inappropriate in negotiations and
dispute settlement. In part, their objections
stem from the North–South imbalance.
Northern civil society groups, including trade
associations, generally have the resources to
engage the WTO. Many Southern govern-
ments fear that allowing greater civil society
participation will further turn the odds
against them. It is understandable that these
new WTO members are reluctant to dilute
the benefits of their membership in this once-
exclusive club. But civil society demands have
become so strong, effective, and globally con-
nected that efforts to fend them off will only
result in damage to the WTO as a whole. The
companion to internal reform must therefore
be a systematic effort to address the wide-
spread public perception that the interna-
tional trade regime is largely closed to public
scrutiny and participation. 
The WTO’s relationship with the outside
world has already begun to change. The
increasing impact of trade rules on other pol-
icy areas has compelled the WTO to engage
in regular interaction with a wider range of
multilateral organizations, especially the
United Nations Environment Program and
United Nations Development Program.
Growing public interest in its work has com-
pelled the WTO to organize public meetings
and consultations, as well as engage in a series
of regional conferences and workshops
designed to encourage interaction between
the WTO Secretariat and the public. The sec-
retariat has also made significant progress
toward document availability. Its 1996 dere-
striction policy, which calls for informal but
regular meetings with the public, and the
availability of its documents on the Internet
now enable more people around the world to
review its material. 
Nevertheless, citizens still lack access to
the information that would enable them to
comment on trade policy as it is being consid-
ered or to present their views in any meaning-
ful way. Citizens must be empowered to
participate in the formation of policy before
decisions are made, not after. Although public
participation is seldom efficient, democratic
governments must earn public support by
engaging in a degree of open discussion, shar-
ing information, and subjecting their deci-
sions to public scrutiny. The WTO has yet to
satisfy civil society groups on these counts.
External reforms should permit sustained
interaction among the WTO, its members,
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participate in the formation of policy
before decisions are made.
and the interested public. Now, interaction is
sporadic, and is often based on late or leaked
documents and occasional WTO-organized
symposia. Other intergovernmental organiza-
tions have devised means to facilitate such
sustained interaction—indeed, efforts to keep
the WTO relatively closed are swimming
against a powerful tide of greater citizen par-
ticipation in global institutions. The United
Nations and many of its agencies routinely
involve NGOs in their deliberations and have
standard procedures for accreditation. The
International Monetary Fund and World
Bank have steadily increased the flow of
information publicly available about their
plans, policies, and proceedings. In intergov-
ernmental treaty negotiations on many issues,
NGOs have become constructive players.
They are routinely incorporated into negotia-
tions on environmental issues, receiving
country position papers and draft treaties as a
matter of course. Even for issues traditionally
under state control, such as arms control and
disarmament, NGOs have proven themselves
indispensable interlocutors among contend-
ing governments and between governments
and the public. Both the existence of the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the sur-
vival of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
are due in part to the roles played, often
behind the scenes, by NGOs.
External reform also should address the
dispute-settlement process. Because institu-
tionalized efforts such as the WTO
Committee on Trade and Environment have
so far failed to resolve policy tensions, the dis-
pute-resolution procedure is the WTO’s de
facto policy-setting organ. To ensure that all
groups and interests affected by WTO deci-
sions know about and have a voice in those
decisions, NGOs want the dispute-settlement
and appellate body proceedings open to pub-
lic observation, and they want the right to
submit amicus curiae (friend of the court)
briefs directly to dispute-settlement panels
and the WTO appellate body. Although the
appellate body has ruled that panels may con-
sider amicus briefs submitted by NGOs,
many developing countries object vehemently
to what they see as a usurpation of their right
to design dispute-settlement procedures.
These strongly voiced objections appear to
have deterred panels from taking amicus
briefs into consideration. This controversy
badly needs to be resolved, and an effective
mechanism for public input needs to be
designed. 
No one is suggesting that NGOs should
have a vote in either trade negotiations or dis-
pute settlement. The final authority in all
these institutions and forums rests firmly
with governments. But NGOs have proven
their value as sources of ideas and as educa-
tors of the public on a wide range of interna-
tional issues. Now, it is urgent that the WTO
devise an effective way to reap the benefits of
NGO participation. The alternative is the sta-
tus quo: a system incapable of making diffi-
cult policy decisions and facing increasing
pressure from a flood of demands for public
involvement. Ultimately, the threat to the
global trading system is not just violence in
the streets, but a backlash against the WTO
and a much-reduced chance for further trade
liberalization.
Who Will Lead?
During the very short life of the WTO, the
world has changed a great deal. And although
industrial countries will continue to consume
the vast share of global goods and services for
the foreseeable future, they neither can nor
should continue to dictate the rules for the
global economy. Information technology, the
growing acceptance of democratic values, the
increasing role of developing countries as
engines of growth, mounting environmental
degradation and income inequality, and basic
demands of equity are rendering the old ways
unworkable. The WTO has a key role to play
in creating new ways, but only if it can rid
itself of its “gentleman’s club” approach to
trade bargaining. Although the WTO Secre-
tariat can effect some changes on its own, it
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can only undertake serious reform under
instruction from its members. To allow the
WTO to operate as a true international
organization, comprising a diverse member-
ship and accountable to both that member-
ship and the public, member nations must
demonstrate leadership and agree on a reform
agenda.
The Doha WTO ministerial presents
influential WTO member governments with
an opportunity to build a sound foundation
for global economic rule making. But at pres-
ent they seem blinded by their own short-
term self-interest. If trade liberalization is ever
to become a “moral imperative,” as envi-
sioned by U.S. president George W. Bush,
industrial countries—and particularly the
United States, the most powerful actor in the
global economy—must relinquish their long-
standing domination of the global trading
system. So far, industrial countries have
shown little willingness to pay more than lip
service to developing-country concerns over
the inequities built into the current rules,
procedures, and implementation practices. A
country such as the United States could
demonstrate its sincerity before Doha by sup-
porting proposals offered by other govern-
ments to allow the WTO Secretariat to
provide greater assistance to developing coun-
tries engaged in dispute-settlement proceed-
ings. Further, both the United States and the
European Union could reconcile the incon-
sistencies between their desire to expand mar-
ket access for agricultural products with
domestic programs that subsidize local pro-
duction and effectively underprice develop-
ing-country producers. Unfortunately, this
kind of policy coordination is not currently
among the subjects under discussion by par-
liaments and administrations.
Supachai Panitchpakdi of Thailand—
who next year will become the first WTO
director-general from a developing country—
has an opportunity to make these dual reform
tracks the cornerstone of his term. Just as
only Richard Nixon could go to China, per-
haps only someone such as Supachai, strad-
dling the worlds of the powerful and the
disenfranchised, can broker this monumental
bargain. But it will not be easy. Reforming
the WTO sufficiently to redress its internal
and external deficiencies will be difficult for
powerful industrial countries, because this
reform will create political difficulties at
home. By making a commitment to real
internal reform, however, industrial countries
could sway developing countries to accept the
external reforms those countries currently
oppose. Such farsighted leadership on the
part of all concerned—the WTO Secretariat
and its member governments—is essential if
the global trading system is ever to overcome
its current gridlock on key, sensitive issues
and earn the respect it needs from people
worldwide.
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